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Abstract: The present study contributes to the literature on the economics of discrimination by 
considering some consequences of sexual orientation discrimination. Specifically, we analyse LGB 
people's decision to "come out" within an identity utility theoretical framework, and estimate the 
model on a representative sample of the EU population. We aim to investigate the factors that 
systematically affect a person's inclusion in competing definitions of LGB people and the potential 
role of sample selection biases, such as the one leading to the commonplace mistaken assumption of 
the affluence of gay men. Interval regression estimates of the risk attitude coefficient within the 
choice to come out suggest that heterogeneity in the objective dimensions of socio-economic 
welfare may explain a sample selection between "out" and "closeted" LGB people, which lies 
behind the "myth of gay affluence". 
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  1. Introduction 
 
Within the expanding literature on the economics of discrimination, the discrimination faced 
by lesbian, gay and bisexual people (LGB henceforth)12 is mostly overlooked. This is the result of 
very problematic issues connected with the availability of data which pose major statistical 
constraints to researchers’ ability to produce quantitative studies. Klawitter (2015) reports that, in 
refereed-journal published papers on the topic, researchers had to settle for as few as 20 relevant 
observations to estimate wage gaps for gay or lesbian workers. 
While other disciplines have analysed the life experiences of LGB people with qualitative 
methods, quantitative studies on sexual orientation discrimination are specifically rare due to the 
intrinsic characteristics of the LGB population. Difficulties in gathering and analysing data on LGB 
people arise from the sheer dimension of such a population (SMART 2009; Joloza et al. 2010).3 
Further difficulties arise from the fact that, given the often hostile environment that they perceive to 
live in, LGB people may choose to lie in scientific surveys. This may depend, for example, on the 
interview method (Berg and Lien 2006; Coffman et al. 2013).  
The aforementioned problem is compounded with a larger, conceptual issue in the very 
description of the universe under study. Indeed, at least three competitive definitions of who is an 
LGB person can be found in the literature (Klawitter 2015). The most diffused definition in 
empirical studies is based on people’s behaviour. This sometimes refers to their sexual behaviour 
but, as it is more common in economic studies, it may instead concern co-living or being in a same-
sex relationship. Differently, psychological and sociological studies often carry out empirical 
analyses relying on identity-based definitions (e.g., self-declaration or self-representation as an 
LGB person) and/or on definitions related to the responder’s inner feelings (e.g., having ever felt 
attracted by someone of the same/opposite sex, etc.). Screening a sample of people on the basis of 
these three definitions produces overlapping but in no way identical sub-samples, as for example a 
person may engage in sexual activities with people of the same sex and yet she may not perceive 
herself as homo- or bisexual.  
These issues add to the difficulties of studying the LGB population. As documented by 
Carpenter (2012), estimates of the LGB wage gap in the USA based on self-reported definitions of 
sexuality (i.e., identity-based definitions) tend to produce larger differences between LGB workers’ 
incomes and the heterosexual population than definitions based on behaviour. Similarly, from a 
meta-analysis of 63 published studies, Klawitter (2015) reports a statistically significant impact of 
the definition of a person’s sexuality on the parameter estimates of wage regressions.  
By studying which factors systematically affect a person’s inclusion in one or more of the 
above-mentioned aggregates of LGB people, and specifically the relation between behavioural- and 
identity-based definitions, the present paper contributes to the literature on sexual orientation 
discrimination. In particular, the object of investigation is whether and how these differences may 
arise from a sample selection bias. 
However, despite these difficulties, a growing number of studies document substantial 
sexual orientation discrimination in the labour market, both in the field of human resources policies 
(see, e.g., Ahmed et al. 2013, Patacchini et al. 2012, Drydakis 2009, and Weischselbaumer 2003) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The acronym is not exhaustive of the broad range of possible gender identities commonly investigated and identified 
in queer studies and the so-called LGBI community. The present work focuses on sexual orientation discrimination and 
the life experiences of LGB only due to issues of data availability. For a review of the literature on the discrimination 
against transsexual and transgender people, see e.g. Botti and D’Ippoliti (2016). 
3 The small size of the LGB population makes general population surveys virtually ineffective as a data collection 
method, unless very large samples are collected. However, overly large samples specifically aimed at collecting a 
minimum number of observations for this (or other) minority often imply very low cost efficiency, while recourse to 
non-representative, ad hoc or convenience samples is purposely avoided because the generalizability of the results is 
often unclear (SMART 2009). For these reasons, the UK Office for National Statistics recommended the inclusion of 
relevant questions in a wide range of surveys that are already recurrently carried out by national statistics offices (Joloza 
et al. 2010). 
	  and earnings (see Klawitter 2015 for a recent review), and the housing market (Leppel 2007, and 
Ahmed and Hammarstedt 2009), as well as several other domains such as health or education (see 
Botti and D’Ippoliti 2014 for a comprehensive review). Fewer studies focus on gender identity 
discrimination, possibly because the abovementioned empirical constraints are even stricter when 
one wants to study the life experiences of trans people (Lombardi et al. 2001, Botti and D’Ippoliti 
forthcoming).  
More recent works tend to evidence how being open about one’s belonging to the LGB 
population is a significant correlate of wellbeing in its multi-faceted acceptations.  Botti and 
D’Ippoliti (2014) concentrate on its more purely economic aspects, Mills et al. (2004) on the 
psychological perspective, Gusmano (2009), instead, examines the risk of being subject to 
discrimination. Studies focusing on the role played by individual income in the process of 
disclosure raise valuable pieces of evidence that challenge the common assumption that gay men 
and lesbians are more affluent than heterosexuals (Badgett 2001, Badgett et al. 2013, Botti e 
D’Ippoliti 2014). However, these studies lack a formal theoretical approach. 
In this work, we study LGB people’s decision to “come out” within an identity utility 
theoretical framework. This assumes that being out increases individuals’ identity utility.4 Since 
Akerlof and Kranton’s (2000) seminal contribution, social identity models have been applied to the 
investigation of various subjects of economic concern (see Akerlof and Kranton 2010 for an 
overview) and the relevance of this framework has been assessed in several laboratory experiments 
(Chen and Chen 2011, Chen and Li 2009, Currarini and Menge 2012). We frame the individual 
decision as a risky choice, in so far as “out” LGB people face a higher risk of discrimination than 
“closeted” LGB people. Accordingly, we develop a model of expected identity utility and estimate 
it on a representative sample of the EU population. 
 
 
2. The decision to come out 
 
2.1. Disclosure in the literature 
 
In recent years, a growing body of literature focused on the relationship between sexual 
orientation and earnings, discussing on the possible causes of a LGB wage penalty (for a 
comprehensive review see Botti and D’Ippolti, 2014; see Klawitter, 2015 for a meta-review).  
Few studies discriminate between disclosed and closeted individuals within the LGB 
population, thus possibly being exposed to the risk of producing biased empirical results. Plug and 
Berkhout (2008) collect information on the workplace disclosure of male graduates in the 
Netherlands in order to distinguish possible discrimination and selection effects in the LGB 
earnings gap. Comolli (2005) explores the relationship between LGB earnings and disclosure in US 
cities, though ignoring possible differences with the heterosexual workers. In the framework of a 
multidimensional assessment of social exclusion, Botti and D’Ippoliti (2014) distinguish between	  
LGB people who are open about their sexuality and those who choose not to declare it. All these 
studies highlight strong heterogeneity within the LGB population, between people who are out and 
those who are not. 
A handful of studies explored the decision-making process of disclosure and its effects. 
Coming out is a complex process of acceptance and disclosure of an individual’s sexual orientation; 
the economic literature mostly focused on disclosure of sexual orientation in the working 
environment. Studies of nondisclosure in other disciplines have documented negative health and 
psychological effects from concealing one’s sexual orientation also in healthcare settings 
documenting differential patterns of nondisclosure within the LGB population (see Durso and 
Meyer 2013). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The issue of voluntary disclosure is in principle more connected to identity than to behaviour, given the political 
relevance of “coming out” in the LGB movement since the ‘70s of last century (Badgett, 1996).  	  
	  Escoffier (1975) suggests that individual preferences with respect to disclosure affect 
occupational choices according to the different degree of tolerance in alternative categories of jobs 
(with the distinction of “conservative”, “liberal”, and “ghetto” occupations). Several studies relate 
coming out in the workplace to greater job performance and productivity (Drydakis 2011, Everly et 
al. 2012), and to a safer and cooperative working environment (Day & Schoenrade, 1997; Griffith 
& Hebl, 2002, Rostosky & Riggle, 2002; for a comprehensive review see Ozeren 2014), while 
underperformance is associated to LGB employees’ cognitive efforts to hide their sexual orientation 
(Madera, 2010). 
Extant literature especially fails to capture the role of individuals’ socioeconomic status in 
the decision to come out. According to a cost-benefit approach carried out by Badgett (1996), 
income potentially affects the decision process of disclosure in the workplace in a conflicting way: 
on the one hand, individuals with higher income face higher potential opportunity costs, e.g. in 
terms of job loss (Schneider, 1986); on the other hand, greater ability to overcome negative 
reactions to disclosure is associated to wealth, authority and power. In the framework of an 
investment model of disclosure (Woods, 1993) explicitly accounting for risk (income at risk as a 
result of coming out) and future benefits (psychological and political), individuals with higher 
income are more able to pay for disclosure. 
In Plug and Berkohout (2008) the earnings gap suffered by gay and bisexual people is 
mainly driven by closeted LGB workers, while those who came out in the workplace exhibit wages 
equivalent to heterosexual workers even in a labour market that discriminates. The authors consider 
Akerlof and Kranton’s (2000) identity utility model as a possible interpretation of the selection 
mechanism.  
According to Badgett (2001), those who enjoy better socio-economic conditions are more 
likely to disclose their sexual orientation. Accordingly, the direction of causality would proceed 
from greater earnings to being out. This would give rise to stereotypical and misleading impression 
that LGB people would be richer than average, due to a “sample selection” issue (the “myth of gay 
affluence”). The stereotype is however challenged by evidence of a significant earnings gap as well 
as of a sexual orientation “poverty gap”, recently reported by Badgett et al. (2013). For the case of 
Italy, Botti and D’Ippoliti (2014) detect a distinctly higher social exclusion suffered by closeted 
LGB people (although only emerging when objective variables, and not psychological well-being, 
are considered). Their data also suggest the existence of a selection effect, since those who are open 
about their sexual orientation often exhibit average or good levels of social inclusion. 
 
 
2.2. Data sources and descriptive statistics 
 
We use data from Eurobarometer 71.2 (June 2009) and 77.4 (June 2012), collecting 
information on a representative sample of the EU population aged 15 years and over in 2009 and 
2012 respectively. Eurobarometer is a recurrent survey commissioned by the European Commission 
to assess EU citizens’ opinions on a number of topics of interest for European policymakers. In the 
two waves selected, at separate stages of the interview interviewees were asked two relevant 
questions:  
 
i) if the person considers herself to be part of any among seven listed minority groups (among 
which “other”, “none” and “don’t know” were included), including the option “a sexual 
minority (like being a gay, lesbian, or bisexual)”; 
ii) if during the previous 12 months the person has personally felt discriminated against or 
harassed on the basis of one or more among 11 possible grounds, among which “sexual 
orientation (being gay, lesbian or bisexual)”. 
 
Question i) in fact asks individuals about their sexual orientation and/or gender identity, and 
the interviewees’ answers are both a measure of their identity and of their willingness to disclose it 
	  to the interviewer. Question ii) is posed at a much earlier stage of the interview, and concerns more 
life experiences than identity. Yet, obviously the answer to this question may indirectly convey 
information on the person’s sexual orientation.  
As noted in the introduction, previous literature already remarked that there is no a priori 
reason to expect an exact overlapping of the distributions of answers to the two questions. Indeed, 
Table 1 shows how in a merged 2009 and 2012 dataset, containing more than 56,000 observations, 
less than 1% of the sample selected the relevant answer to one of the two questions, and 0,2% to 
both. Overall, 1,056 individuals directly or indirectly affirmed their LGB identity, of which 520 did 
so directly (i.e. choose the corresponding answer to question i above) and 536 did only indirectly 
(i.e. they declared of having felt discriminated against because of their sexual minority identity).  
In what follows, for ease of terminology we will refer to the condition of an out LGB person 
who experienced discrimination as “scenario a”, an out LGB person who did not experience 
discrimination as “scenario b” and a person who only indirectly communicated her identity to the 
interviewer (i.e. she is not out, but she experienced discrimination anyways) as “scenario c”. The 
last cell in table 1 comprises “scenario d”: it includes all people of which we do not know the sexual 
orientation, because they may be heterosexual (and therefore not part of a “sexual minority”, in the 
questionnaire’s words) or they are LGB people who chose not to disclose their identity and they did 
not experience discrimination (or they do not wish to reveal about it). 
 
 
Table 1. Distribution of the sample by scenario 
 
  Experienced discrimination   
  Yes No Total 
Self-identified 
(“out”) LGB 
Yes Scenario a: 0.20% 
Scenario b: 
0.73% 0.92% 
No Scenario c: 0.95% 
Scenario d:  
98.13% 99.08% 
  Total 
 
1.15% 
 
98.85% 
 
N = 56,390 
      
Notes: shaded areas denote the “LGB sample”. Pearson Chi2(1) = 1900*** 
 
 
Descriptive statistics of these subsamples (reported in table A1 in the online appendix) show 
that LGB people exhibit a lower mean and median age and a relatively higher share of men than the 
rest of the sample. These differences are more marked for the out LGB subsample, and indeed 
restricting the comparison to non-out LGB individuals (i.e. those whom we observe, that is who 
declared they were discriminated against), the sex distribution is not statistically different from the 
rest of the sample. 
Comparing the available information on individuals’ economic conditions, it emerges that 
LGB people exhibit a statistically significant lower share of homeowners (the only indicator for 
accumulated wealth in the survey). However, a divarication emerges between out and non-out LGB 
people in other domains. Considering the accumulation of human capital, it emerges that out LGB 
have significantly higher educational attainments than the rest of the sample, whereas non-out LGB 
people do not. Similarly, self-perceived social status (on a scale from 1 to 10) is significantly higher 
for out LGB people than the average, while for non-out LGB people it is not different from the rest 
of the population.  
These findings are confirmed by simple probit estimates of the probability of being out (for 
the whole sample and for LGB people only) and of having experienced sexual orientation 
discrimination. Concerning the former, educational attainments are found to significantly increase 
the probability of being out, jointly with a positive time trend (denoted by a “year 2012” dummy 
variable) and the person’s political orientation. The latter variable is measured in the survey on a 1 
	  to 10 left-right ordinal scale, and it emerges that self-defined politically “centre” people as well as 
those who refuse to answer or do not know what to answer exhibit significantly lower probabilities 
of being out. Accordingly, given the politicization of LGB rights issues in most EU Member States, 
it may be possible that individual preferences impact on the decision to come out.  
Concerning the factors associated with a higher risk of experiencing discrimination, 
education is not found as a significant correlate, whereas certain occupations are. Not surprisingly, 
being out is estimated to increase the probability of being discriminated against by as much as 
150%. 
In conclusion, it would seem that Eurobarometer data provides some evidence in favour of 
the “myth of gay affluence” hypothesis, in so far as it emerges that out LGB people fare, in 
economic terms, better than the average, whereas non-out LGB people do not. However, a 
descriptive analysis must necessarily suffer from the potential bias – of unknown empirical 
relevance – arising from sample selection issues. Indeed, as already noted, any investigation 
employing random population surveys cannot observe the whole LGB population, because a 
number of LGB people may decide not to disclose their identity to the interviewer. In our case, 
“scenario d” in Table 1 encompasses both heterosexual and closeted LGB people, and therefore 
even our “LGB sample” does not comprise the whole LGB population in the sample.  
In order to overcome this potential source of bias, and to study causal links, the next section 
describes an economic model of the decision to come out, which is then estimated in section 4.  
  
	   
Table 2. Probit estimates of the probabilities of being “out” and of experiencing 
discrimination, marginal effects 
 
 
 Probability of being out Probability of experiencing discrimination 
 Whole sample LGB Discriminated Whole sample LGB Out        Year: 2012 0.171*** 0.406*** 0.523*** 0.0269 -0.325*** -0.0327 
 [0.0364] [0.105] [0.181] [0.0343] [0.105] [0.182] Age -0.0187*** -0.0140 -0.0454** -0.00600 -0.0263 -0.0692** 
 [0.00621] [0.0149] [0.0225] [0.00629] [0.0169] [0.0286] Age quadratic 0.0111* 0.00583 0.0380 0.00346 0.0309* 0.0682** 
 [0.00666] [0.0160] [0.0243] [0.00652] [0.0179] [0.0313] Woman -0.0561 0.0338 -0.0450 -0.0578* -0.0689 -0.0417 
 [0.0351] [0.0866] [0.141] [0.0343] [0.0901] [0.153] Education: secondary 0.0827* 0.244** 0.371* -0.0262 -0.172 0.127 
 [0.0495] [0.114] [0.190] [0.0436] [0.118] [0.219] Education: tertiary 0.0911* 0.202* 0.409** -0.00951 -0.0731 0.244 
 [0.0517] [0.122] [0.203] [0.0477] [0.125] [0.223] Occupation: manager 0.0714 0.104 0.261 -0.00686 -0.0460 0.513 
 [0.0853] [0.208] [0.425] [0.0830] [0.209] [0.454] Occupation: white collar 0.119 0.0251 0.954** 0.127* 0.329 1.167*** 
 [0.0821] [0.199] [0.392] [0.0751] [0.203] [0.437] Occupation: manual worker 0.108 0.186 0.788** -0.00797 0.0373 0.718* 
 [0.0763] [0.184] [0.379] [0.0709] [0.184] [0.416] Occupation: house person 0.0313 -0.00741 0.702* 0.114 0.242 0.987** 
 [0.101] [0.227] [0.426] [0.0848] [0.233] [0.502] Occupation: unemployed 0.109 -0.165 0.517 0.175** 0.372* 1.014** 
 [0.0878] [0.207] [0.400] [0.0780] [0.214] [0.458] Occupation: retired 0.0457 0.0748 0.499 0.0241 0.102 0.678 
 [0.0907] [0.213] [0.427] [0.0807] [0.217] [0.479] Occupation: student -0.00463 0.0602 0.770* 0.00105 0.00407 0.290 
 [0.100] [0.239] [0.448] [0.0969] [0.245] [0.487] Home ownership -0.0994** -0.0713 -0.103    
 [0.0395] [0.0980] [0.157]    Political orientation: centre -0.0989** -0.181* -0.155    
 [0.0435] [0.109] [0.183]    Political orientation: right -0.0191 -0.0927 -0.0196    
 [0.0472] [0.120] [0.201]    Political orientation: no answer -0.250*** -0.296** -0.0361    
 [0.0567] [0.134] [0.211]    Out LGB    1.499***   
    [0.0665]   Constant -1.734*** 0.472 -0.434 -2.131*** 0.939** -0.0116 
 [0.178] [0.419] [0.686] [0.187] [0.473] [0.819] Observations 56,201 1,052 536 56,390 1,050 478 
Correctly classified 99.07% 68.06% 81.34% 98.85% 68.67% 79.29% 
       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. Reference categories: left-wing political orientation (values 1-4), primary education, self-
employed. Control variables include country fixed effects (33), 3 dummy variables denoting the size of the community in which the 
person lives, 15 dummy variables denoting the structure of the household in which the person lives. Missing observations with respect 
to table 1 have been dropped in the estimation because of perfect prediction.  
        
  
	  3. A model of Expected Identity Utility 
 
Following Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 2005), we assume that individuals gain utility not 
only from their actions (consumption, leisure time, etc.) but also from those aspects of social life 
that may be traced back to their identity. Accordingly, an individual i’s utility is defined as 
 𝑈! = 𝑈 𝑋! , 𝐼!              (1) 
 
where 𝑋! is a matrix including i’s actions (𝑎!), other individuals’ actions (𝑎!!) and possibly a 
number of social or contextual variables. 𝐼! is the argument of individual i’s utility function that is 
related to her identity, determining the “identity utility”. Similarly to 𝑋!, 𝐼! depends on i’s and other 
individuals’ actions, but it also depends on i’s individual characteristics (𝑏!) and a number of social 
categories (𝑐!) to which she belongs and/or she identifies herself with: 
 𝐼! = 𝐼 𝑎! , 𝑎!! , 𝑏! , 𝑐!             (2) 
 
We focus on a specific social group with which the individual may identify, that is LGB 
people. Accordingly, ci can take on two values: 𝑐! = 1 if i is an LGB person, and 𝑐! = 0 otherwise. 
For 𝑐! = 1, among i’s several possible actions, we focus on the decision to come out, denoted by the 
variable Oi, which can take on the value 1 if i publicly declares her belonging to the LGB social 
category, and 0 otherwise. Among other people’s actions that may impact on i’s utility, we single 
out acts of discrimination on grounds of i’s sexual orientation (disc). Accordingly, 𝑎!! takes on 
value disc, if i experiences discrimination, and 0 otherwise. 
In our baseline model, we assume that for all LGB people (i.e., if ci =1) identity utility is 
higher if they decide to come out (the assumption will be relaxed at a later stage): 
 𝐼! 𝑂! = 1  |  𝑎!! , 𝑏! >    𝐼! 𝑂! = 0  |  𝑎!! , 𝑏!          (3) 
  
For all individuals, we assume that being discriminated against reduces utility, producing 
psychological costs and/or objective economic damage: 
 𝑈! 𝑎!! = 0  |  𝑋! , 𝐼! >   𝑈! 𝑎!! = 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐  |  𝑋! , 𝐼!          (4) 
 
We can therefore define the utility of an out LGB person who suffered discrimination as 
 𝑈! 𝑋! , 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐, 𝐼 𝑏! , 𝑐! ,𝑂 = 1           (6) 
 
and the utility of an out LGB person who did not experience discrimination as  
 𝑈! 𝑋! , 0, 𝐼 𝑏! , 𝑐! ,𝑂 = 0           (6) 
 
In analogy with the four scenarios described in section 2.2, to simplify notation, let us define  𝑈! 𝑋! , 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐, 𝐼 𝑏! , 𝑐! ,𝑂 = 1 ≡ 𝑈! 𝑎 , and 𝑈! 𝑋! , 0, 𝐼 𝑏! , 𝑐! ,𝑂 = 0 ≡ 𝑈!(𝑏). Given [4], 𝑈! 𝑎 < 𝑈!(𝑏). 
Depending on a number of observable individual characteristics (e.g., living in a household 
composed of only two adults of the same sex, etc.), anyone may fall victim of discrimination on 
other people’s assumption of her sexual orientation (regardless of the assumption being true or 
wrong). Thus, assuming rational expectations, for each LGB person the expected probability of 
being discriminated if she comes out, 𝑝! 𝑎 , is a function of her relevant observable characteristics, 
including being out, with  𝑝!|!!! >   𝑝!|!!!. Or, using the same symbols adopted for U,  𝑝! 𝑎 > 𝑝! 𝑐 . 
Accordingly, the expected utility of an LGB person i, in case she decides to come out, is  
 𝐸𝑈!  |  !!! = 𝑝!(𝑎) ∙ 𝑈!(𝑎) + 1 − 𝑝! 𝑎 ∙ 𝑈!(𝑏)        (7) 
	   
If i decides not to disclose her sexual orientation, she also faces a risky prospect, of which the 
expected utility is given by 
 𝐸𝑈!  |  !!! = 𝑝! 𝑐 ∙ 𝑈! 𝑋! , 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐, 𝐼 𝑏! , 𝑐! ,𝑂 = 0 + 1 − 𝑝! 𝑐 ∙ 𝑈! 𝑋! , 0, 𝐼 𝑏! , 𝑐! ,𝑂 = 0 ≡ ≡ 𝑝!(𝑐) ∙ 𝑈!(𝑐) + 1 − 𝑝! 𝑐 ∙ 𝑈!(𝑑)         (8) 
 
If i has expected utility preferences, she will decide to come out if 
 Δ𝑈! = 𝐸𝑈!  |  !!! − 𝐸𝑈!  |  !!! > 0         (9) 
 
In this model, the decision to come out depends on the values of 𝑝! 𝑎  and 𝑝! 𝑐 , which determine 
the risk of the two lotteries, and i’s preferences towards risk. The model can be extended to allow 
for heterogeneity in individual preferences. For example, one may allow for individuals to 
simultaneously identify with more than one social category.  
Specifically, we extend the identity utility function in [2] by considering a second social 
category with which i may identify, summarising her political orientation (lri).5 Accordingly, we 
allow for heterogeneity in individuals’ preferences towards coming out by replacing the hypothesis 
in [3], that all LGB individuals gain identity utility from coming out, with the following: 
 
 𝐼! 𝑂! = 1  |  𝑎!! , 𝑏! , 𝑙𝑟! ⋛    𝐼! 𝑂! = 0  |  𝑎!! , 𝑏! , 𝑙𝑟!       (3 bis) 
 
In this extended model, the identity utility gains from coming out vary across individuals: 
they are mediated by i’s political self-placement, and for some individuals they may even take on 
negative values (denoting identity utility losses). Accordingly, the individual will decide to disclose 
her sexual orientation if: 
 Δ𝑈! = 𝑝! 𝑎 ∙ 𝑈!    𝑎     𝑙𝑟! + 1 − 𝑝! 𝑎 ∙ 𝑈!    𝑏     𝑙𝑟! − 𝑝! 𝑐 ∙ 𝑈!    𝑐     𝑙𝑟! + 1 − 𝑝! 𝑐 ∙ 𝑈!    𝑑     𝑙𝑟! > 0  
 (9 bis) 
 
 
3.1. Estimation strategy 
 
We proxy individuals’ expectations of suffering sexual orientation discrimination if they come out 
and if they do not, denoted by 𝑝! 𝑎  and 𝑝! 𝑐 , respectively, through the predicted values of the 
probit models discussed in section 2.2. 𝑝! 𝑎  is estimated on out LGB individuals only, whereas 𝑝! 𝑐  is estimated on the whole sample of non-out LGB individuals because we do not assume that 
closeted LGB individuals systematically exhibit a probability of being discriminated against 
different from heterosexual individuals if this cannot be explained by some observable 
characteristic. Available evidence for Austria (Weichselbamer 2003), Greece (Drydakis 2011), Italy 
(Patacchini et al. 2012), and Sweden (Ahmed et al., 2013), and suggests that heterosexual 
individuals who carry visible indicators of a potential homosexual or bisexual orientation risk being 
discriminated against not dissimilarly from LGB people. 
We estimate the payoffs in [9] and [9 bis] by the linear predictions of ordered probit models 
of individuals’ self-assessed life satisfaction. In the Eurobarometer survey, the latter is measured on 
a 1 to 4 ordinal scale, respectively denoting the answers “very satisfied”, “fairly satisfied”, “not 
very satisfied” and “not satisfied at all” (with a further “don’t know” option). As noted in section 
2.2, for scenario d (not out LGB, not discriminated against) it is impossible to distinguish the 
answers by closeted LGB individuals from those of their heterosexual counterparts. However, while 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 As noted in section 2.2, in the Eurobarometer survey lr is measured on a one-dimensional 1 to 10 left-right ordinal 
scale (allowing for individual non response and including a residual “don’t know” answer). 
	  this constraint was not relevant for the estimated probabilities of being discriminated, it poses 
additional limitations to our analysis. Specifically, in order to obtain unbiased estimates of 𝑈!   (𝑑)  and 𝑈!    𝑑     𝑙𝑟! , it is necessary to make two further assumptions.  
The first assumption is that for each person the identity utility gain (loss) from coming out, 
given all other variables, is independent of the possible subsequent experience of discrimination. As 
a consequence, with reference to the extended model: 
 Δ𝐼! = 𝑂! = 1  |  𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐, 𝑏! , 𝑙𝑟! −    𝐼! 𝑂! = 0  |  𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐, 𝑏! , 𝑙𝑟! = 𝑂! = 1  |  0, 𝑏! , 𝑙𝑟! −    𝐼! 𝑂! = 0  |  0, 𝑏! , 𝑙𝑟!  
 (10) 
 
In other words, for each individual (though not necessarily across individuals) 𝑈!    𝑎     𝑙𝑟! −𝑈!    𝑐     𝑙𝑟! = 𝑈!    𝑏     𝑙𝑟! − 𝑈!    𝑑     𝑙𝑟! .  
The second necessary assumption is that for each person the utility loss from being 
discriminated against, given all other relevant variables, is independent of being out, that is (with 
reference again to the extended model): 
 Δ𝑈! = 𝑈! 𝑎!! = 0  |  𝑋! , 𝐼! ,𝑂! = 1 −   𝑈! 𝑎!! = 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐  |  𝑋! , 𝐼! ,𝑂! = 1 = 𝑈! 𝑎!! = 0  |  𝑋! , 𝐼! ,𝑂! = 0 −  𝑈! 𝑎!! = 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐  |  𝑋! , 𝐼! ,𝑂! = 0           (11) 
 
In other words, for each individual, 𝑈!    𝑎     𝑙𝑟! − 𝑈!    𝑏     𝑙𝑟! = 𝑈!    𝑐     𝑙𝑟! − 𝑈!    𝑑     𝑙𝑟! . Given [10] 
and [11], for each person the four Ui can be proxied by the linear predictions from the ordered 
probit regressions reported in table A2 in the online appendix. For each individual, these values are 
standardized to take on values between 0 and 1 (Wakker, 2008). Descriptive statistics of the 
resulting payoffs are reported in table A3. 
Denoting the predicted payoffs respectively by Ua, Ub, Uc and Ud, and assuming a power-
law functional form for the bernoullian utility (i.e., constant relative risk aversion, CRRA), the 
individual  decides to disclose her sexual orientation if 
 𝑝!(𝑎) ∗ 𝑈!! + 1 − 𝑝!(𝑎) ∗ 𝑈!! − 𝑝! 𝑐 ∗ 𝑈!! + 1 − 𝑝! 𝑐 ∗ 𝑈!! > 0    (12) 
 
where β is a parameter measuring individuals’ attitude towards risk, and α = 1 – β  is usually 
interpreted as a measure of risk aversion.  
For each individual in the LGB sample we observe one choice: either she is out or not. 
Given the predicted expected identity utilities, we compute for each person what range of values of 
β, i.e. what degree of risk aversion, is compatible with the observed choice. This approach is a 
variant of the Random Preference approach (see, among others, Moffatt et al. 2002), commonly 
used in experimental economics.  
 
 
4. Main results and discussion 
 
Given individuals’ predicted probabilities of experiencing discrimination and payoffs, their 
observed choice to disclose (or not) their sexual orientation allows us to identify a set of values of 
their risk aversion parameter that might have produced such choice. These values are typically half-
closed intervals, denoting a minimum or maximum value for β.  
For between 48% and 49% of the sample we cannot ascertain whether the observed choice 
is a clear indication of risk aversion, risk neutrality or risk seeking attitudes, because the intervals of 
βs compatible with the observed choice include zero (risk neutrality) and positive and/or negative 
values, as shown in table 3.  
For the rest of the sample, the baseline model predicts a substantially higher share of risk-
adverse individuals (roughly 50%) with respect to the model with heterogeneity (33%). Such result 
is not surprising, given that the former model implies that if an individual with a relatively low 
	  probability of experiencing discrimination decides not to disclose her sexual identity, it must be 
because she is markedly risk adverse (and vice versa). By contrast, the latter model allows for the 
individual to only weakly desire to come out (or even, in extreme cases, not to obtain utility from 
coming out at all).   
 
 
Table 3. Interval estimates of the risk aversion parameter  
 
 Baseline model With heterogeneity Risk-adverse 50.28% 33.14% 
Risk-seeking 0.85% 18.84% 
Undetermined 48.86% 48.01% 
Left-censored observations 518 472 
Right-censored observations 514 564 
Interval observations 17 12 
Min. uncensored β: mean -0.033 -0.052 
Min. uncensored β: min -2.241 -2.413 
Min. uncensored β: max 0.001 0.001 
Max. uncensored β: mean 0.001 0.045 
Max. uncensored β: min -0.001 -0.001 
Max. uncensored β: max 1.486 2.259 
Observations 1049 1048 
 
 
For both models considered here, we run interval regression estimates on the sets of feasible 
βs to investigate whether observable individual characteristics systematically affect LGB people’s 
risk aversion in their crucial choice to come out.  
For the baseline model (table 4), age is found to have a very small negative impact on the 
propensity to risk, while the 2012 time dummy exhibits a small positive impact. A slightly positive 
constant is found to be not significantly different from zero when other control variables are added.6 
We subsequently control for objective indicators of economic resources, i.e. human capital 
and home ownership, subjective assessments of a person or her family’s economic and financial 
security, and subjective assessments of the country’s macroeconomic situation.  
As shown in table 4, having completed at least secondary education reduces the variance of 
the estimation errors, but apart from this none of these variables is found to systematically impact 
on LGB people’s risk attitude.  
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Some country fixed effects turn out to significantly affect the risk aversion parameter both in the baseline model and 
when allowing for heterogeneity in preferences: further results are available from the authors upon request. 
	  Table 4. Interval regression of the risk aversion parameter, baseline model 
 
 β  ln(σ) β  ln(σ) β  ln(σ) β  ln(σ) 
         
Age -0.000700* -0.00492 -0.000708* -0.00506 -0.000831* -0.00488 -0.000855* -0.00556 
 [0.000376] [0.00590] [0.000416] [0.00663] [0.000463] [0.00658] [0.000471] [0.00661] Woman -0.00493  -0.00255  -0.000738  -0.000219  
 [0.00738]  [0.00711]  [0.00699]  [0.00692]  Year: 2012 0.0300*  0.0257*  0.0311*  0.0304*  
 [0.0165]  [0.0148]  [0.0166]  [0.0162]  Education: secondary  -0.591** 0.0277 -0.793*** 0.0271 -0.734*** 0.0259 -0.698*** 
  [0.254] [0.0172] [0.282] [0.0172] [0.271] [0.0166] [0.267] Education: tertiary  0.0485 0.0196 -0.114 0.0184 -0.338 0.0169 -0.302 
  [0.293] [0.0171] [0.340] [0.0165] [0.347] [0.0159] [0.347] Home owner  -0.305 -0.00245 -0.391 -0.00775 -0.173 -0.00757 -0.155 
  [0.240] [0.00925] [0.263] [0.00934] [0.240] [0.00923] [0.238] Social status: middle     0.00681  0.00653  
     [0.00974]  [0.00959]  Social status: high     0.0185  0.0175  
     [0.0130]  [0.0127]  Social status: na/dk     -0.0306  -0.0299  
     [0.0251]  [0.0248]  HH fin. situation: rather good     -0.0216  -0.0200  
     [0.0162]  [0.0157]  HH fin. situation: rather bad     -0.0299  -0.0274  
     [0.0199]  [0.0193]  HH fin. situation: very bad     -0.0397  -0.0370  
     [0.0252]  [0.0244]  HH financial situation: na/dk     -0.0247  -0.0260  
     [0.0409]  [0.0408]  Job situation: rather good     -0.00253  -0.00266  
     [0.0121]  [0.0121]  Job situation: rather bad     0.00376  0.00699  
     [0.0142]  [0.0146]  Job situation: very bad     -0.00623  -0.00171  
     [0.0175]  [0.0176]  Job situation: na/dk     0.0161  0.0197  
     [0.0191]  [0.0198]  Country: bad empl. situation       -0.00107  
       [0.00855]  Country: bad econ. situation       -0.00994  
       [0.00948]  Occupation: manager   0.0187  0.0144  0.0159  
   [0.0186]  [0.0180]  [0.0183]  Occupation: white collar   0.0179  0.0185  0.0175  
   [0.0173]  [0.0179]  [0.0177]  Occupation: manual worker   0.0212  0.0233  0.0234  
   [0.0167]  [0.0177]  [0.0178]  Occupation: house person   -0.000893  0.00278  0.00261  
   [0.0180]  [0.0184]  [0.0183]  Occupation: unemployed   -0.00192  0.00279  0.00251  
   [0.0166]  [0.0172]  [0.0172]  Occupation: retired   0.0227  0.0225  0.0219  
   [0.0183]  [0.0190]  [0.0187]  Occupation: student   0.0262  0.0178  0.0164  
   [0.0260]  [0.0233]  [0.0232]  Country fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Constant 0.0469* -1.773*** 0.00564 -1.587*** 0.0236 -1.745*** 0.0293 -1.767*** 
 [0.0280] [0.571] [0.0275] [0.597] [0.0317] [0.600] [0.0328] [0.595] Observations 1,049 1,049 1,049 1,049 1,049 1,049 1,049 1,049 
         
         *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1         
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. Reference categories: primary education, self-employed, “low” social status, “very good” personal 
job situation, “very good” household financial conditions. Control variables include country fixed effects (33) and 3 dummy 
variables denoting the size of the community in which the person lives. 
 
  
	   
Table 5. Interval regression of the risk aversion parameter, model with heterogeneity in 
preferences 
 
 β  ln(σ) β  ln(σ) β  ln(σ) β  ln(σ) 
         
Age -0.000657 -0.00905 -0.000440 -0.0184* -0.000600* -0.0794** -0.000631** -0.0817* 
 [0.000562] [0.00999] [0.000458] [0.00975] [0.000308] [0.0343] [0.000308] [0.0439] Woman 0.00261  0.00637  0.00219  0.00292  
 [0.0124]  [0.00830]  [0.00277]  [0.00288]  Year: 2012 0.0356  0.0216  0.0105*  0.00885*  
 [0.0266]  [0.0163]  [0.00565]  [0.00525]  Education: secondary  -1.775*** 0.0283 -2.413*** -0.00264 -3.312*** -0.000747 -3.436** 
  [0.644] [0.0405] [0.632] [0.00670] [1.121] [0.00706] [1.381] Education: tertiary  -1.033 0.0280 -1.040* -0.00660 -4.057*** -0.00619 -4.433*** 
  [0.635] [0.0477] [0.598] [0.00749] [1.122] [0.00766] [1.489] Home owner  0.343 0.0111 0.971** 0.0103* 3.128*** 0.0105* 3.235*** 
  [0.392] [0.0101] [0.449] [0.00585] [0.483] [0.00582] [0.461] Social status: middle     -0.00552  -0.00571  
     [0.00645]  [0.00743]  Social status: high     0.00139  -0.000202  
     [0.00657]  [0.00742]  Social status: na/dk     0.00143  -0.000583  
     [0.0111]  [0.0128]  HH fin. situation: rather good     -0.0105  -0.0109*  
     [0.00643]  [0.00616]  HH fin. situation: rather bad     -0.00836  -0.00753  
     [0.00655]  [0.00564]  HH fin. situation: very bad     -0.0111  -0.0118  
     [0.00836]  [0.00857]  HH financial situation: na/dk     -0.0257  -0.0212  
     [0.0234]  [0.0199]  Job situation: rather good     0.00286  0.00359  
     [0.00374]  [0.00367]  Job situation: rather bad     -0.00488  -0.00214  
     [0.00574]  [0.00547]  Job situation: very bad     -0.000886  0.00109  
     [0.00545]  [0.00502]  Job situation: na/dk     0.0176*  0.0209*  
     [0.00953]  [0.0108]  Country: bad empl. situation       -0.00172  
       [0.00350]  Country: bad econ. situation       -0.00476  
       [0.00336]  Occupation: manager   0.0519  -0.00272  -0.00256  
   [0.0382]  [0.00661]  [0.00585]  Occupation: white collar   0.0270  -0.00249  -0.00438  
   [0.0242]  [0.00556]  [0.00585]  Occupation: manual worker   0.0228  -0.00487  -0.00566  
   [0.0208]  [0.00528]  [0.00500]  Occupation: house person   0.00446  0.000165  -0.00395  
   [0.0188]  [0.00514]  [0.00548]  Occupation: unemployed   -0.000220  -0.0258**  -0.0242**  
   [0.0206]  [0.0128]  [0.0119]  Occupation: retired   0.0293  0.00402  0.00328  
   [0.0250]  [0.00529]  [0.00454]  Occupation: student   0.160  0.0121  0.00962  
   [0.104]  [0.00991]  [0.00841]  Country fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Constant 0.00933 -0.330 -0.0496 -0.218 0.0410* 2.137 0.0444* 2.359 
 [0.0299] [0.754] [0.0508] [0.752] [0.0240] [2.291] [0.0251] [3.082] Observations 1,048 1,048 1,048 1,048 1,048 1,048 1,048 1,048 
         
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1        
 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. Reference categories: primary education, self-employed, “low” social status, “very good” personal 
job situation, “very good” household financial conditions. Control variables include country fixed effects (33) and 3 dummy 
variables denoting the size of the community in which the person lives. 
As shown in table 2, human capital is found as a significant correlate of the probability to be 
out. Thus, its lack of impact on individuals’ risk propensity signals that LGB people with higher 
	  educational attainments face an ‘easier’ choice, i.e. for them the expected value of the identity 
utility of coming out is higher and/or the risk of coming out is lower than for people with lower 
educational attainments, as shown in table 6. Such less risky choice on the side of higher educated 
individuals may also explain the lowering impact of educational attainments on the variance of the 
residuals. Jointly, these results suggest that heterogeneity within the LGB population in objective 
dimensions of socio-economic welfare may explain the “sample selection” between out and 
closeted LGB people that lies behind the “myth of gay affluence” (first denounced by Badgett 
2001). 
Allowing for heterogeneity in individual preferences on coming out (table 5), similar results 
are obtained concerning demographic variables and the constant term. Concerning the indicators of 
economic resources, it is found that uncertainty (or unwillingness to answer) on one’s job position 
has a small, mildly significant impact on the propensity to risk. However, a larger, more statistically 
significant and negative impact is found for the condition of being unemployed. Thus, it would 
seem that at least for the unemployed the myth of gay affluence is not only a matter of constraints 
(as found above) but of preferences (towards risk) too. 
 
 
Table 6. Human capital and the choice to come out 
 
 Primary education Secondary education Tertiary education     
 Mean St. Dev. Median Mean St. Dev. Median Mean St. Dev. Median           
 Baseline model U(a) 0.8745 0.0098 0.8717 0.8735 0.0075 0.8717 0.8829 0.0218 0.8717 
U(b) 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 
U(c) 0.8204 0.0140 0.8164 0.8189 0.0108 0.8164 0.8325 0.0313 0.8164 
U(d) 0.9459 0.0042 0.9447 0.9454 0.0032 0.9447 0.9495 0.0094 0.9447 
EU(Out) 0.9693 0.0118 0.9707 0.9700 0.0119 0.9730 0.9740 0.0123 0.9759 
EU(Closeted) 0.9438 0.0049 0.9431 0.9434 0.0039 0.9433 0.9479 0.0101 0.9436 
          
 Model with heterogeneity U(a) 0.8813 0.0175 0.8857 0.8824 0.0161 0.8857 0.8927 0.0262 0.8857 
U(b) 0.9940 0.0116 1 0.9955 0.0104 1 0.9960 0.0099 1.0000 
U(c) 0.8297 0.0414 0.8119 0.8259 0.0401 0.8119 0.8356 0.0493 0.8226 
U(d) 0.9423 0.0437 0.9261 0.9389 0.0429 0.9261 0.9389 0.0428 0.9261 
EU(Out) 0.9664 0.0167 0.9715 0.9686 0.0163 0.9736 0.9730 0.0166 0.9760 
EU(Closeted) 0.9405 0.0436 0.9253 0.9371 0.0428 0.9253 0.9375 0.0428 0.9257 
          
 Predicted probability to experience discrimination 
          P(a) 0.2420 0.0883 0.2286 0.2355 0.0907 0.2108 0.2152 0.0846 0.1975 
P(c) 0.0162 0.0116 0.0125 0.0156 0.0131 0.0106 0.0130 0.0107 0.0094 
 
 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
So far, quantitative economic studies on social orientation discrimination have been affected 
by major statistical challenges mostly connected with the availability and quality of data. The small 
size of the population spiced with problems of misreporting and non-response on the one hand, and 
the alternative definitions of the target group on the other hand, both undermine statistical analyses 
that aims to capture the effects of discrimination. 
The present paper aimed at identifying the factors that systematically determine a person’s 
inclusion in one or more of the possible aggregates of LGB people. Complying with a certain 
definition and being consequently included or excluded in the sample object of investigation may 
	  generate severe selection biases, e.g. between out and closeted LGB people. We maintain that the 
“myth of gay affluence”, that is the widespread belief that lesbians and gay men are more affluent 
than the general population, is a consequence of such biases.  
Following Akerlof and Kranton (2000), we study LGB people’s decision to “come out” by 
means of an expected identity utility model. In such model, the decision to come out depends on the 
risk of experiencing discrimination as well as the identity utility of freely expressing one’s sexual 
orientation.  
We estimate such model on Eurobarometer data, collected from a representative sample of 
the EU population aged 15 years and over in 2009 and 2012. For each individual, given the 
observed choice to disclose (or not) her sexual orientation, the probabilities (predicted from the 
data) of experiencing discrimination and the payoffs associated with each outcome, we identify a 
range of values of the coefficient of risk attitude compatible with her observed choice. The ranges 
so obtained are used as dependent variables in an interval regression model. The purpose of this 
exercise is to investige whether observable objective indicators of economic resources 
systematically affect LGB people’s attitude to risk and, consequently, their decision to disclose their 
sexual identity.  
We find that the disclosure decision by higher educated individuals is shown to be 
significantly less risky, while being unemployed makes people more risk adverse. Our analysis 
suggests that heterogeneity in objective dimensions of socio-economic welfare may explain 
different disclosure patterns in the context of an identity utility approach. Thus, our findings unveil 
the “sample selection” between out and closeted LGB people that lies behind the “myth of gay 
affluence”. 
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